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Follow UsDespite numerous conflicts, both conventional and unconventional, the psychology of Pakistan’s Army remains a mystery to India. Their strategies and analyses extend beyond mere military matters, deeply affecting Pakistan’s society, politics, and policies. Consequently, India faces challenges from both overt and covert tactics employed by GHQ Rawalpindi.
As we mark the 25th anniversary of India’s Kargil War victory, it is crucial to pause the celebrations and focus on understanding the psychology of the Pakistan Army. The army's dominance on the domestic front is undeniable, having held this position since Pakistan's inception in 1947, and it is likely to continue in the future. Regardless of the army’s fluctuating reputation, it consistently resurges.
The military’s political influence was evident when it orchestrated an electoral victory with minimal collateral damage. Twenty-five years ago, on this date, the Pakistan Army was at a low point—defeated, isolated, and embarrassed. A prominent general compared the Kargil defeat to a humiliation greater than the loss of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh.
Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan Khattak (retd.), with a personal grudge against General Pervez Musharraf, who had superseded him, viewed the Kargil debacle as a significant setback. Musharraf, who was then a Brigadier, sought to reverse this disgrace when he became Chief of Army Staff.
The strategic importance of the Quaid-e-Azam (father of the nation) territory, perched atop a 450-meter ice wall, added to its prestige. However, the Indian forces’ daring daytime assault on this position did not deter Brigadier Musharraf from continuing his career, eventually attending the Royal College of Defence Studies in London.
Musharraf carried this sense of humiliation with him, and as Director General Military Operations, he proposed a similar Kargil-type strategy in the early 1990s. Benazir Bhutto, upon being briefed, rejected the plan as too extreme.
The renowned psychologist Norman Dixon, in his book ‘On the Psychology of Military Incompetence’, described First World War generals with "lack of imaginative leadership… underestimation of the enemy, delusional optimism." Nevertheless, this does not diminish the reality that the Pakistan Army will likely regain its central role. Therefore, investing in a deeper understanding of this institution, its motivations, and its psychological profile is essential.